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Non-technical summary 
This paper provides empirical evidence for the role of fixed-term contracts FTCs 
as prolonged probationary periods, which allow the employer to better screen 
workers before promoting them to a permanent position. Screening becomes 
necessary if the quality of the job match or the quality of the worker cannot be 
observed by the employer at the time of hiring. Institutionally, the screening 
period may be a legal probationary period during which employment protection 
does not apply. If this legal period is too short to provide information on the 
quality of the job-worker match, the firm may offer the worker an FTC in order 
to extend the screening period. 
 We derive predictions from a job matching model concerning the time 
pattern of exit from two types of employment spells: spells that start with an 
initial episode of FTC work (but are possibly converted into permanent 
employment later on) and those that are started on a permanent contract from the 
outset. We define the first kind of spell as being subject to a ‘treatment’ in the 
sense of the statistical evaluation literature and compare them to spells that have 
not been ‘treated’. Using statistical matching, we make workers in both kinds of 
spells comparable as regards their observed characteristics and compare their job 
exit rates.  
 According to the results, FTCs accelerate exit within the first two years of 
an employment spell by 55 to 80 per cent. However, employment spells started 
on the basis of FTCs are significantly more stable than jobs started on permanent 
contracts in the following years. These results are consistent with a role of FTCs 
as probationary periods. If firing costs are low initially, bad matches are 
dissolved earlier than under high firing costs. Ultimately, however, a firm will 
dismiss all the bad matches. Concerning other theories of temporary work, the 
result of the reversion of the relative exit rates for the two types of contracts after 
two years is inconsistent with any of them.  
 A striking empirical result is that the chances that an employment spell 
will last longer than five years are not influenced negatively if the worker is 
initially employed on a fixed-term contract (FTC). Hence, the sorting processes 
taking place on both types of contracts lead to the same outcome. While this 
result, unlike the acceleration of the sorting process, is not an implication of our 
theoretical model, it is consistent with it under certain parameter constellations. 
Substantially, it suggests that the view that many good job-worker matches are 
terminated accidentally due to the use of FTCs is not supported empirically.  
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1 Introduction 
As a consequence of labour market reforms in many European countries, researchers 
have paid considerable attention to the effects of legally allowing workers and firms to 
conclude fixed-term employment contracts (FTCs). To date, however, empirical 
knowledge of the role of FTCs in individual employment histories remains limited. On 
one hand, FTCs are seen as a trap, fostering a division between ‘ins’ and ‘outs’ in the 
labour market and resulting in an inefficient excess of short-term employment 
relationships. On the other hand, FTCs are regarded as a stepping stone towards regular 
employment, at least for certain groups in the labour market. 
There are two different exit routes from FTCs into regular positions: within the 
company, and across the borders of the company. In this paper, we are concerned with 
the internal route only. The hypothesis we concentrate on in the following is that FTCs 
may serve as prolonged probationary periods, allowing the employer to better screen 
workers before employing them on a permanent contract. Screening becomes necessary 
if the quality of the job match or the quality of the worker cannot be observed by the 
employer at the time of hiring. Institutionally, the screening period may be a legal 
probationary period during which employment protection does not apply. If this legal 
period is too short to provide information on the quality of the job-worker match, the 
firm may offer the worker an FTC in order to have a longer period available for 
screening. In Germany, for instance, the legal probationary period of 6 months appears 
to be long. However, it is shortened substantially by collective framework agreements in 
many industries, in particular for blue-collar workers. 
We derive predictions from a job matching model concerning the time pattern of exit 
from two types of employment spells: spells that started with an initial episode of FTC 
work (but were possibly converted into permanent employment later on) and those that 
were started with a permanent contract from the outset. We define the first kind of spell 
as being subject to a ‘treatment’ in the sense of the statistical evaluation literature and 
compare them to spells that have not been ‘treated’. Using statistical matching, we make 
workers in both kinds of spells comparable as regards their observed characteristics and 
compare their job exit rates.  
A number of papers have addressed transitions from FTCs into permanent 
employment relationships. The Spanish case has found most attention in the literature 
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because the proportion of FTC workers is higher than in any other European country. 
Alba-Ramírez (1998), Amuedo-Durantes (2000) and Güell and Petrongolo (2003) 
analyse the transitions out of FTCs and into other labour market states. These studies 
mostly conclude that temporary employment is not an effective route for entry into 
permanent positions, in particular for women and workers with low qualifications. By 
contrast, evidence from Portugal (Portugal and Verejão, 2002) and the Netherlands (van 
den Berg, Holm and van Ours, 2002; Zijl, van den Berg and Heyma, 2004) does suggest 
a springboard role of FTC employment. For the German case, Boockmann and Hagen 
(2004), Giesecke and Groß (2002) and McGinnity and Mertens (2002) have empirically 
analysed transitions into permanent employment. Again, the likelihood of transition to 
permanent work is much higher than in the Spanish labour market.  
None of these papers, however, deals directly with the question of the consequences of 
FTC spells for job durations. The approach of the present study is, therefore, more 
similar to studies investigating job exit in general. For the German case, Bellmann, 
Bender and Hornstein (2000), Bender, Konietzka and Sopp (2000), Bergemann and 
Mertens (2000), Bergemann and Schneider (2001), Schasse (1991) and Wolff (2004) 
have addressed the determinants of job exits. However, with the exception of the 
descriptive study by Bergemann and Schneider, these studies have not investigated the 
role of FTC work for job exit.  
In the following section, we discuss the implications of job matching theory for the 
time profile of the probability of exit from FTC and permanent jobs. Next, we introduce 
our data. In the fourth section, we describe the statistical matching approach used to 
identify the effects of FTCs and provide detailed information on our empirical 
approach. In the fifth section, we present evidence regarding the determinants of entry 
into FTCs and their consequences for job exit. A final section draws conclusions. To get 
round the homonymy in the word ‘matching’, we use the term ‘job matching’ when 
referring to the theoretical concept and ‘statistical matching’ for the estimation 
technique wherever a danger of confusion arises. 
2 Effects of FTCs on the time pattern of job exit 
The ‘screening’ or ‘probationary periods’ property of temporary work arises in models 
of job matching. In the classic contribution by Jovanovic (1979), job searchers’ abilities 
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are only incompletely observable for potential employers and revealed only after the 
worker’s performance on the job has been monitored for some time. Thus, the quality of 
the match between worker and job is an experience good. The job matching argument 
constitutes a reason why firms hire workers initially on FTCs. On the one hand, long-
term or permanent contracts are desirable because they provide incentives for 
investment into job-specific human capital. On the other hand, firms need to protect 
themselves from unproductive employment relationships by testing the worker during 
an initial FTC period. Only if matching quality is sufficiently high, the contract is 
converted into a permanent one.  
 
2.1 A simple model of job matching 
Consider a partial model1 in which a firm hires a number of workers who stay in the 
firm forever unless they are dismissed.2 Once hired or retained, in each period workers 
either excel or fail. In the first case, the period payoff to the firm is Et = 1, in the second 
case it is Et = –1. Wages are determined outside of the firm and do not reflect the 
performance of the individual worker. We assume that there are two types of matches 
between workers and the firm. If the match is bad, the worker fails with (known) 
probability 1 in each period. If the match is good, the worker fails with (known) 
probability 1 q− . The quality of the match is unknown to the firm at the moment of 
hiring, but the firm has an initial belief concerning the quality of the match, denoted 
by 0p . Firms update their beliefs using Bayes’ rule. For instance, if the worker has failed 
in period t, beliefs change according to 
 
0 1, 1
1Pr( | ,... 1)
1t t t t tt
qG E E E p p p
p q− +
−= − = = <−  , 
 
 (1)
 
                                              
1  Theoretical models that allow for a screening effect of FTCs have been developed by Blanchard and 
Landier (2002) and Portugal and Verejão (2003). Our model focuses on the learning process while 
keeping other aspects, such as wage determination, outside the analysis. Moreover, the model is 
partial in the sense that we do not address why some firms choose permanent contracts to begin with 
while other hire workers only on FTCs. 
2  Voluntary quits are not considered in this model, the reason being that FTCs influence dismissals and 
redundancies more directly than quits. To the extent that FTCs induce a higher intensity of search 
while still on the job and, thus, a higher quit rate, they could induce an acceleration of the sorting 
process similar to the one induced by the effect on dismissals.  
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where pt+1 is the firm’s belief at the end of period t. Firms discount future payoffs with 
discount factor δ.  
We now introduce firing costs due to employment protection. We assume that FTCs 
can be prolonged or terminated at zero costs after each period. Later, we will introduce 
a maximum number of times an FTC can be prolonged. If workers on permanent 
contracts are dismissed, firms have to pay a fixed amount of money F. Let Dt be a 
dummy variable, with 0tD =  if the worker is employed with an FTC in period t and 
1tD =  otherwise. It follows that the expected value of continuing a match at the 
beginning of period t is given by the following recursive equation: 
 
{ }1 1 1 2 1( , ) (2 ) 1 max ( , ),t t t t t t t tEV p D q p EV p D D F+ + + + += − − + δ − .  (2)
 
This value must be higher than the costs of terminating the match, otherwise the worker 
will be dismissed.  
We now derive employment durations under alternative types of contracts. Consider 
first the case without firing costs ( 0,tD t= ∀ ). We denote by ta the time when a worker 
who always failed is dismissed. This duration depends on the prior probability and the 
speed of the updating process determined by q and is found by solving ( ,0) 0ta taEV p = . 
Consider next the case of a permanent contract ( 1,tD t= ∀ ). In this case, the time at 
which a worker who always failed is dismissed, tb, is obtained by solving 
( , )tb tbEV p F F− = − . It can be easily checked that ta tb< : Because ( ,0)t tEV p  and 
( , )t tEV p F−  differ only with respect to the amount of expected future firing costs 
arising in case of dismissal, they cannot differ by more than F at any duration. 
Therefore, ( ,0) ( , )ta ta ta taEV p F EV p F− < − . Following from the definition of ta, the first 
term is zero. The remaining inequality implies that bad matches will not (yet) be 
dissolved at ta if firms face firing costs. Hence, as expected, firing costs protect against 
dismissal. 
Now consider the case of a fixed-term contract that cannot be prolonged at date tmax. 
At that period, the firm has to decide whether the worker shall be promoted to a 
permanent position. Otherwise, the worker will leave the company. The firm compares 
the value of retaining the worker (and possibly incurring future firing costs) with the 
costs of dismissal, which are zero at this period. Thus, the worker will be promoted to a 
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permanent position if ( , ) 0t tEV p F− >  and dismissed otherwise. Suppose that the 
maximum period of successive FTCs, tmax,  is just below ta. Will a worker who always 
failed be retained? The answer is no, because at tmax the expected value of the match 
makes a discrete jump downwards from ( ,0)t tEV p  to ( , )t tEV p F− . The worker will 
only be retained if tmax is below s, where s is defined by ( , ) 0s sEV p F− = . Because  
( , ) ( ,0)t t t tEV p F EV p− <  for all t, it must be that s ta tb< < .  
This implies the following ordering: if maxt s< , FTCs are ineffective as probationary 
periods. All workers are retained up to tb and bad matches are dissolved at that duration. 
If maxs t ta< < ,  bad matches are dissolved at tmax. Finally, if maxta t< , the situation is as 
in the case without the maximum number of prolongations, and bad matches end at ta.  
Comparing FTCs and permanent contracts, there is a period of time from maxmin( , )t ta  
to tb when all bad matches have been dissolved under FTCs but have not yet been 
dissolved under permanent contracts. Thus, while there is initially less employment 
stability among workers hired on FTCs, from maxmin( , ')t t  employment stability in this 
group is at a maximum, because all workers in this group are good matches. By 
contrast, among workers hired on permanent contracts, bad matches exist in the firm 
until tb, when all of them are dissolved. Intuitively, the use of FTCs serves to accelerate 
a sorting process. It changes the time pattern of dismissals so that job exits occur more 
frequently early on in the employment spell but less frequently later. This is the 
prediction to be tested in the empirical part of this paper. 
  
2.2 Selectivity into FTC jobs 
When confronting this simple idea with the data, we need to take into account that 
match quality may not be the same for all matches ex ante. In reality, some matches 
may have a higher probability of turning out as good matches. For instance, a worker’s 
formal qualifications or physical capabilities may or may not meet the requirements of 
the job. If this is observed either by the firm or by the job candidate, problems of 
selection into jobs with probationary periods or FTC jobs will arise.  
A first selection problem consists in the fact that employers’ ex ante assessments of 
match quality differ over potential matches. In this case, employers’ hiring behaviour is 
influenced by the availability of probationary periods or FTCs. Employers may hire 
persons on FTCs who are more likely to turn out as bad matches and who would not be 
hired on permanent contracts. If these matches are dissolved more quickly than 
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permanent ones, this may more be due to hiring behaviour than to the effect of firing 
costs on dismissal behaviour.  
A second problem arises when workers self-select into FTCs and permanent contracts. 
In the model of Loh (1994), workers with higher ability – given other observable 
characteristics such as age, qualification and gender – select into jobs with probationary 
periods (or jobs initially on FTCs).3 Workers with lower ability prefer jobs with full 
employment protection from the beginning. The reason for self-selection is that workers 
with higher ability face lower risks of losing their jobs once their quality has been 
revealed. Firms use the self-selection mechanism by offering wage contracts that imply 
low initial wages and steep wage growth.4 Note that the argument is phrased in terms of 
worker quality, not in terms of match quality. As a consequence of the Loh (1994) 
model, separation rates need not be higher during probationary periods. If only 
individuals who expect to perform well enter jobs with probationary periods (i.e. if 
probation succeeds in inducing self-selection), exit rates may actually turn out to be 
lower on these jobs (Loh 1994: 485). However, if worker quality were controlled for, 
layoffs would still be more frequent in jobs with probationary periods.  
According to this model, one expects high-ability job searchers to enter into FTCs 
whereas low-ability job searchers either take up permanent employment or keep on 
searching for a permanent job. In the empirical estimates, we will attempt to control for 
self-selection of high-ability workers using, in particular, information on individuals’ 
previous work histories. We will indicate in which direction our results may be biased if 
this attempt fails and either form of selection is present. 
 
2.3 Alternative accounts of FTCs  and their implications for job duration 
Some alternative accounts of FTC employment also have implications for job 
durations. Search theory, when allowing for on-the job search, implies that job exit will 
be more frequent in FTC jobs (see Boeri, 1999). Given productivity and given the wage 
                                              
3  For a similar model, see Wang and Weiss (1998).  
4  See also Gibbons and Murphy (1992). A worker at the beginning of his/her career is more willing to 
spend more effort or to accept lower wages if this investment leads to a better assessment of his/her 
ability by (potential) employers and thus a higher lifetime earnings or utility. Using Swiss data, 
Engellandt and Riphan (2003) show that, in line with the prediction of Gibbons and Murphy (1992), 
workers on FTCs invest more effort by working far more hours of unpaid overtime. 
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earned in the job, the reservation wage that induces individuals to move is lower than in 
the case of permanent contracts. Once again, mobility is accelerated by the use of FTCs. 
In contrast to the matching approach, however, once FTCs have been converted into 
permanent employment relationships, there should be no difference in exit behaviour 
between the two groups. 
The use of FTCs is also often explained by the desire of employers to adjust to firm-
specific or macroeconomic shocks. FTC workers serve as a buffer stock allowing firms 
to choose their labour input flexibly (see, for instance, Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 1992). 
If this motive is relevant, we would once again expect to see a higher job exit rate of 
FTC workers. However, once they have made the transition to permanent work, former 
FTC workers should not have higher or lower job stability. Thus, the prediction for job 
exit is the same as in the search model. 
According to human capital theory (Booth, Francesoni and Frank, 2002a), workers 
invest into firm-specific human capital only if they expect to stay in the company for 
some time. Most workers hired on FTCs, however, expect to leave the firm early and 
avoid the investment expenditures. Since human capital accumulation takes time, this 
effect may persist even after the contracts have been converted in permanent ones. As a 
consequence, wages rise more slowly for workers hired on FTCs, they are promoted 
later than workers hired on permanent contracts, and they may be the first who are made 
redundant if the need arises. Similar to matching theory, human capital theory predicts 
long-lasting differences between the group of former FTC workers and workers hired on 
permanent contracts, but in contrast to matching theory, the groups of former FTC 
workers consists of individuals whose characteristics are worse than those of other 
workers and who exit earlier rather than later. 
In the following, our focus is on whether the distinct time pattern of job exit implied 
by the interpretation of FTCs as sorting mechanisms can be confirmed, but we also 
address whether the evidence conforms to any of the competing theories.5 Our empirical 
approach is to identify effects of an initial FTC episode in the employment spell. We are 
interested in how workers whose employment spell began with an FTC fare in 
                                              
5  Given the great heterogeneity of FTCs found by other authors (see the previous section), these 
theories may be true for particular segments of the labour market while they may not hold for others. 
However, due to the limitation of the data there is little scope for testing the implications for 
particular groups of workers. 
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comparison with those who have always been on a permanent contract. Therefore, the 
‘treatment’ does not consist in current job status (FTC or permanent) but in contract 
status of individuals in the first year of their employment spell. Hence, we use only 
information on contract type from the first year of employment in a particular company.  
While we interpret FTCs as a discrete treatment, the approach could be extended to 
account for the duration of treatment, i.e. length of the FTC until the time of conversion. 
As the next section shows, however, it is impossible to retrieve current contract status 
from our data for a substantial part of the data. In Germany, the vast majority of FTCs 
last only for up to two years, after which the employment relationship is either 
terminated or renewed on the basis of a permanent contract (Boockmann and Hagen, 
2004). With relatively little variation in the time spent on FTCs, the additional insight 
gained from considering current contract status as opposed to initial contract status is 
likely to be limited. 
3 Description of the sample 
The data base of our study is the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), a 
representative household survey of the German population conducted on an annual 
basis.6 We restrict our analysis to West Germany because a large share of FTC 
employment is subsidised by active labour market programmes in the East. Moreover, 
general labour market conditions are very different in the two parts of the country. For 
these reasons, East Germany would merit a separate analysis.  
The key section from the questionnaire for our purpose is worded as follows: ‘Do you 
have an employment relationship with a fixed duration from the outset, or do you have a 
permanent employment contract?’7. This question is part of the annual questionnaire 
used from 1995. Before that year, the question was only asked to individuals having 
started a new job in the previous year. In order to use information prior to 1995, our 
research is based on contract status in the first year of the employment spell only.   
                                              
6  Details on the SOEP can be obtained from the web-server of the German Institute of Economic 
Research (DIW) in Berlin (http://www.diw-berlin.de/soep/). 
7  ‘Haben Sie ein von vornherein befristetes Arbeitsverhältnis oder haben Sie einen unbefristeten 
Arbeitsvertrag?’ 
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The character of the SOEP as an annual survey introduces the problem that short 
durations are under-sampled. We limit interpretation to jobs that have lasted at least for 
a period of one year. This seems also expedient from an economic point of view: many 
FTCs are of a seasonal or otherwise short-term nature. A number of features (such as 
part-time nature or frequent recalls to the previous employer) distinguish seasonal or 
casual work from more stable fixed-term contracts. Moreover, due to probationary 
periods workers hired on the basis of permanent contracts do not enjoy employment 
protection immediately. Hence, firing costs will differ only after any probationary 
periods have ended, which is the case after a maximum of 6 months according to 
German law. 
As we define it, fixed-term work does not include apprenticeships, which are always 
based on fixed-term contracts in Germany. The sample is limited to spells started after 
age 21, and we drop all information after 57 years of age. Employment spells in the 
public sector are excluded because FTCs are often used as an integral part of the career 
paths of certain occupations in public employment, such as doctors and university 
teachers. Moreover, there are sometimes restrictions on the conversion of fixed-term to 
permanent positions in the public sector, in particular in higher education. 
 We define an employment spell to be an uninterrupted period of employment by the 
same employer. A condition for inclusion of a spell is that we must observe the 
beginning of the spell and contract status at the beginning. Hence, only spells started 
after 1985 are included, and the maximum duration of a spell in the sample is 18 years.8 
Extensive care has been given to the consistency of information on employment spells 
over survey dates. The variable containing the start of the spell is based on a question 
asked annually about the exact calendar month and year of the start of current 
employment. Inconsistent information between years concerning the start date of the 
spell leads to elimination from the data. However, if the inconsistency is minor (<6 
months), we substitute the earlier information for the subsequent spells that deviate 
from this information, in order to minimise recall error. If information on spells is 
interrupted, we code spells as right-censored at the date of interruption (January of the 
year in which non-reporting occured). Otherwise, the end of the spell is defined as the 
month prior to which the subsequent episode (employment, unemployment or non-
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employment) began. In cases in which the beginning of the next episode is not reported, 
we fix the end of spell at six months after the month of interview.  
The first two rows of Table 1 show that there are over 4700 employment spells for 
men in the sample and close to 4000 for women. Of these, between 16 and 18 per cent 
are started on FTCs.9 This number is, of course, much higher than the ratio in the stock 
of employment, which figures around 7 per cent for West Germany in the observation 
period. At the same time, it is an under-estimate of the proportion of FTCs in all new 
employment spells. This is due to the fact that spells with durations of less than a year 
are under-sampled in the SOEP.10 
The median duration for spells started in FTC employment is 22 months for men and 
21 for women, while the corresponding numbers are 39 months and 32 for spells that 
have always been permanent. Figure 1 presents Kaplan-Meier estimates of the empirical 
survivor curve for job duration, distinguishing between contract type and between men 
and women but not accounting for any other characteristics. Log-rank tests clearly reject 
equality of the empirical survivor curves across contract types at very high significance 
levels (see table 1). However, the shapes of the survivor functions are much more 
distinct for men as compared to women. In the latter case, the functions converge after 
50 months duration. 
Table 1 also contains median durations according to educational categories and age. If 
hired on permanent contracts, low-skilled workers tend to have shorter employment 
durations than workers with completed vocational education or university education. 
The differences are less pronounced for workers hired on FTCs. As expected, job 
durations rise with the age at start of spell. Of all workers in the youngest category hired 
on FTCs, half of them have left their jobs 15 months after entry.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                    
8  In the matching procedure, we also require information from the period before the spell started, 
which further limits the number of spells that can be used. 
9  Or, more exactly, are observed to be FTCs in the first year of observation. Some spells may have 
been started on an FTC but have been converted into a permanent contract before the first 
observation.  
10  On the basis of the IAB Establishment Panel, which contains all employment starts in the first half of 
each year in the panel firms, we estimated that the share of hirings on FTC jobs in all hirings is about 
33 per cent for West Germany during the period from 1997 to 2003 (Boockmann and Hagen, 2005).  
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Figure 1: Kaplan-Meier estimates of the empirical survivor curve for job duration 
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Table 1: Number of employment spells and median durations   
 Started on an 
FTC 
Started on a 
permanent 
contract 
log-rank χ2 for differences 
in survivor curves 
Men 847  
(22) 
 3902 
(39) 
61.93 
 
Women 644 
(21) 
3342 
(32) 
18.48 
 
Unskilled 456 
(18) 
1717 
(28) 
19.75 
 
Vocational education 888 
(23) 
4851 
(37) 
39.73 
 
University education 185 
(25) 
869 
(47) 
12.28 
 
< 25 years 368 
(16) 
1363 
(26) 
30.68 
 
25 – 35 years 588 
(21) 
3094 
(35) 
35.94 
 
> 35 years 541 
(30) 
2813 
(42) 
13.29 
 
Note: Median durations in parentheses  
4 Using Statistical Matching to Control for Selection into FTC Jobs 
In the following, we aim to identify the causal effect of contract status at the start of 
the employment spell on survival and wages in subsequent years within the same spell. 
To the extent that observed job durations are due to unobservable match quality, the 
estimated effects on exit rates will be unconditional with respect to this influence. 
Hence, estimated survival rates reflect the changing composition of the two groups with 
respect to match quality over time as well as genuine duration effects. In our case, this is 
not a disadvantage because the predictions of job matching and alternative theories were 
phrased in terms of outcomes unconditional on the quality of worker-firm matches (see 
sections 2.1 and 2.3). 
The parameter to be estimated in the following is the average treatment effect on the 
treated (ATT). The ATT indicates how ‘treated’ workers (i.e. workers initially on FTCs) 
have fared relative to a situation in which the same workers have not been treated (i.e. if 
their employment contracts had been permanent from the start). The ATT is interesting 
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from a policy perspective because the ‘treated’ group is often seen as a group put at a 
disadvantage by labour market regulation. If Y1 and Y2 are the outcomes with and 
without treatment, T is treatment and Z are observed covariates, the ATT is  
 
[ ]
[ ] [ ]
1 0
1 0
| 1,
| 1, | 1,
E Y Y T Z
E Y T Z E Y T Z
θ = − =
= = − =   
 
 
 
 
The second term in the second line is the counterfactual outcome which must be 
constructed from the data. To do so, a statistical matching approach is used in order to 
control for observed heterogeneity between treated and untreated workers. Statistical 
matching models have previously been used to deal with the selection into temporary 
contracts by Hagen (2002, 2003).  
Matching entails the conditional independence assumption (CIA): conditional on the 
covariates, contract form at the start of the job and outcomes are assumed to be 
independent. In particular, we assume that conditionally on the covariates, the outcome 
for a worker initially on an FTC in the state of non-treatment is the same as the outcome 
for a non-treated worker: 
 
[ ] [ ] [ ]0 0 0| 1, | 0, |E Y T Z E Y T Z E Y Z= = = =  .   
 
The question of whether this assumption is justified in our context is a delicate one. 
There are two kinds of heterogeneity, heterogeneity with respect to the quality of the 
worker and heterogeneity with respect to the quality of the match. We control for the 
first kind of heterogeneity by the inclusion of suitable covariates. In particular, we 
control for variables of the employment history. The assumption here is that worker 
quality is reflected in past employment history and other characteristics. In case the 
assumption is violated, there will be an upward bias of the effect of FTC if there is 
negative selection bias (the less able workers are given FTCs) and a downward bias if 
selection bias is positive (the career concerns model).  
We cannot control for the second kind of heterogeneity. But according to the job 
matching literature, the second kind of heterogeneity is not observed by the actors at the 
moment of contract conclusion. Rather, it is experienced while the employment contract 
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is fulfilled. Following this assumption, the quality of the match is uncorrelated with 
contract type. In case the latter assumption is violated, there may be selection bias on 
unobservables so that workers expected to be better matches are given permanent 
contracts while matches with lower expected quality are made on the basis of FTCs. We 
do not observe some of the circumstances an employer can observe when hiring a 
worker, such as references or the exact specialisation of the job candidate. If the 
employer chooses a permanent contract for matches expected to be good and an FTC for 
matches that are likely to turn out to be bad, and if these expectations are correct on 
average, possible negative effects of initial FTC status on job duration and wages will 
be over-estimated.11  
Statistical matching is implemented by performing a Probit estimate of the propensity 
score first. Since the number of potential control observations is high in our sample, we 
use simple one-to-one nearest neighbour matching without replacement. Results were 
affected only little when replacement was allowed for, more neighbours were chosen or 
kernel-based matching was applied.12 Since individuals taking up employment from 
different labour market states may differ in their further prospects regarding job 
stability, we match only individuals with the same labour market state in the period 
before the start of a new employment spell. A calliper of 0.1 was chosen to remove 
matches whose propensity scores are relatively far apart. This appeared to be a 
reasonable compromise between avoiding bias and minimising the loss of observations.  
5 Estimation Results  
5.1 Estimation of the propensity score  
In the estimation of the propensity score, we use information from the interview prior 
to the first observation in the new spell. The variables used for explaining contract 
status are all related to the person. They consist, first, of demographic characteristics 
such as age, education, nationality and disability. Second, we use variables relating to 
                                              
11  In interpreting our results, we abstract from general equilibrium effects of FTC contracts. If these 
contracts stabilise permanent employment relationships as suggested by Bentolila and Saint-Paul 
(1992), Saint-Paul (1996) and others, a possible positive effect of FTC status on the exit rate may be 
over-estimated. 
12  We used the psmatch2 routine implemented in Stata 8.2 by Leuven and Sianesi (2003). 
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the household context. Third, we use information on previous spells wherever available, 
such as tenure in the previous job, the reason why the previous job was terminated 
(dismissed, expiry of a previous FTC job, quits and other reasons), and the number and 
duration of previous unemployment spells. Furthermore, we include the employment 
state (FTC, permanent, vocational training, self-employment, unemployment, out of the 
labour force) in the period in which matching takes place and in the period before. We 
also include the unemployment rate of the federal state interacting it with employment 
state, as well as annual and federal state dummies. The exact definition of the variables 
can be found in table A1. 
Table A2 in the appendix shows the results from probit estimation. The performance 
of the estimation is quite different for men and women. Only a few variables are 
significant in explaining contract status for female workers. Women with university 
education are more likely to be hired on FTCs than women with vocational education, 
and they are more likely to take up FTC work if their previous employment ended due 
to the expiration of an FTC spell. Among men, there is a significant effect of age and 
nationality on contract form. A number of the variables of the individual employment 
history, such as previous permanent employment, the duration of a spell out of the 
labour force or previous FTC experience also have significant coefficients. 
Figure 2 displays estimated kernel density functions of the propensity score. The fact 
that contract form is better explained for men than for women is clearly visible in the 
distribution of predicted FTC probabilities. The distributions are much more distinct for 
male as compared to female workers. As a result, we expect that the matching procedure 
will introduce more changes compared to the descriptive evidence for men than for 
women. In both cases, the two groups do not have separate regions of support. Imposing 
the common support condition does, therefore, not lead to many losses in the data. 
Matching is performed using the predicted linear index from probit estimation. Table 
A3 in the appendix shows results from a balancing test. We observe that matching is 
able to reduce the differences in the values of the covariates between the treatment and 
the control group. With one exception, there remain no significant differences in 
covariates, and their magnitudes are reduced substantially both for men and women. 
Most importantly, there are no significant differences in the propensity score. 
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Figure 2: Kernel density estimates of the distribution of the predicted FTC probability 
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 Another check on the quality of matching is the pre-programme test of outcomes 
before the date of treatment. We will discuss this test in section 5.3 below. After 
estimation of the propensity score and imposition of the common support condition, 
there remain 478 matched pairs for men and 449 pairs for women. 
 
5.2 Effects of FTC episodes on job stability  
In this section, we test the prediction, derived from the sorting or probationary periods 
model of section 2, that employment stability in jobs started with FTCs is initially 
lower, but higher after the sorting process has been concluded. As an outcome variable, 
we first use the empirical Kaplan-Meier survival rates on the matched samples. This 
measure is better suited than average durations or a dummy variable indicating survival 
on the job at a certain time because it deals appropriately with right-censoring. The 
parameter of interest is the survivor function at time t after the start of the job. Figure 3 
displays Kaplan Meier estimates of the survivor function for the treatment and the 
control group. 
Due to matching, the differences between spells with and without initial FTC episodes 
are smaller than the descriptive evidence suggests, but they are still significant: logrank 
tests yield χ²-statistics of 6.29 and 4.37 for men and women, respectively, both of which 
are significant at the five per cent level. We observe that for both men and women, there 
is a downward effect of initial FTC status on survival in the job for the first two years. 
From this period on, however, survival rates converge. Strikingly, the survivor curves 
come very close or even touch after about four and a half years and are hardly 
distinguishable from that time on. This implies that the probability of being in long-term 
employment of more than five years is not affected negatively by working initially on 
the basis of an FTC. This finding holds for women, where the empirical survivor curve 
already shows such a development, but equally for men.  
A caveat is that, due to earlier exit and due to right-censoring occurring at earlier 
durations, the number of spells with long durations is limited. For men, there remain 
165 untreated and 115 treated spells after two years duration; of these, 60 untreated but 
only 29 treated spells are observed to end in the following three years. For women, 150 
untreated and 90 treated spells are still on-going after two years, and the numbers of job 
exits during the following three years are 52 and 22, respectively.  
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Figure 3: Kaplan-Meier survivor functions for matched samples 
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In the next step, we use a proportional hazard model on the matched sample in order 
to reduce the variance of the estimates and to obtain parameters of a baseline hazard, the 
second quantity of interest in this part of the analysis. In addition to the information 
included in the propensity score, we can account for time-varying characteristics 
influencing the exit rate. Moreover, we can condition on job-related characteristics such 
as industry and firm size that are excluded from estimating the propensity score. In line 
with the prediction of Topel and Ward (1992), we also control for the role of wages in 
determining job exit.13 We specify the model as a proportional hazard model. The 
baseline hazard is specified as a piecewise constant function with annual intervals.  
Table 2 contains hazard ratios, since these also allow a quantitative assessment of the 
covariate influences.14 Values larger than one indicate a positive influence, values of 
less than one a negative influence.15 Concerning the covariates, firm size matters for job 
exit, with significantly lower exit rates from employment in larger firms. In line with the 
results of Topel and Ward (1992), the wage exerts a negative effect on exit rate which 
is, however, only significant at the ten per cent level for women. Married women and 
divorced or widowed men have higher exit rates than unmarried women or married 
men, respectively. Female workers of non-German nationality have lower exit rates, and 
dismissal from a previous job has a positive effect on exit from the current job for men. 
One would expect higher mobility rates for younger workers due to job shopping 
(Johnson, 1978) and a decline of mobility with age except close to the upper age bound 
of 57 where the phenomenon of early retirement becomes relevant. Surprisingly, 
however, age is insignificant in determining job exit. 
                                              
13  In our estimation design, wages are also potentially influenced by treatment. Hence, there may be an 
indirect effect of treatment via wages which may to some extent bias the influence of treatment on the 
hazard rate (see Simonsen and Skipper, 2003).  
14  The hazard ratio minus one gives the per cent change of the hazard induced by a unit change of the 
covariate. Formally, the hazard ratios are given by  
 [ ]1 1 0
0
( ; )
exp ( )
( ; )
t z z z
t z
λ γ = − γλ γ , 
 so they are the exponentiated coefficients if we consider a unit change in the covariate z. 
 
15  We use standard errors uncorrected for the effect of matching and imposition of the common support 
condition. While this is only an approximation of the true standard errors, for practical purposes the 
differences between the approximation and bootstrapped standard errors appear to be small (Lechner, 
2002). 
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Table 2: Results from proportional hazards estimation on the matched sample 
 Men Women 
 Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. 
Baseline hazard                              
(reference group: <12) 
    
12-23 *** 0.350 6.21  *** 0.308 6.62 
24-35 *** 0.509 3.36 *** 0.422 3.77 
36-47 *** 0.437 3.40 *** 0.485 2.64 
48-59 *** 0.158 3.61  ** 0.469 2.24 
60+ *** 0.180 4.72 *** 0.266 3.72 
<12, start as FTC *** 1.652 3.30 *** 1.544 2.80 
12-23, start as FTC ** 1.538 2.51 *** 1.772 2.95 
24-35, start as FTC 0.587 1.49 0.875 0.43 
36-47, start as FTC * 0.414 1.87 ** 0.215 2.10 
48-59, start as FTC  1.057 0.08 * 0.368 1.69 
60+, start as FTC 0.813 0.42 0.803 0.47 
     
Wage 0.969 1.53 * 0.955 1.77 
Match position/qualification 1.022 0.21 0.920 0.63 
Firm size 20-199  ** 0.775 2.08 ** 0.762 1.99 
Firm size 200-1999 *** 0.619 3.15 ** 0.691 2.07 
Firm size > 2000 *** 0.618 2.61 0.876 0.76 
No education * 1.224 1.79 1.094 0.76 
Master 0.735 1.17 0.523 1.01 
University 1.195 0.91 1.232 0.91 
Age 0.960 0.14 1.120 0.36 
Age squared 1.030 0.04 0.667 0.47 
Age cubic 1.042 0.06 1.436 0.48 
Foreigner 1.009 0.08 ** 0.739 2.20 
Disabled 1.476 1.55 1.203 0.81 
Children 1.063 0.51 0.941 0.52 
Married 0.942 0.41 *** 1.562 3.00 
Divorced/widowed * 1.464 1.84 1.186 0.79 
Dismissed ** 1.380 2.40 0.928 0.43 
Expiry of previous FTC 1.052 0.24 1.257 0.74 
Tenure last job 0.969 1.56 0.983 0.77 
Never on FTC 0.890 1.10 0.868 1.14 
Number of UE spells 0.958 1.30 1.055 1.29 
UR * year ** 0.877 1.97 1.017 0.25 
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Table 2 (continued) : Results from proportional hazards estimation (continued) 
Number of observations 1529 1245 
Number of spells 626 532 
Number of observed exits 311 284 
Log-likelihood initial  -707.23 -616.96 
Log-likelihood final -580.86 -506.76 
Notes: The table includes hazard ratios. Values smaller than 1 indicate a negative influence of the 
independent variable on exit rates. Time, regional and industry dummies included. Standard errors 
allow for clustering at the person level. ***, ** and * denote significance at the one, five and ten per 
cent levels. 
 
Regarding employment relationships started on permanent contracts, the baseline 
hazard suggest a highly significant drop of 65 per cent for men and 70 per cent for 
women in the duration dependence after one year. From that time, the baseline hazard 
remains stable but falls again markedly after four years of tenure. The coefficients for 
spells with an initial FTC episode represent the differences as compared to the 
coefficients for permanent contracts in the respective duration interval. They show that 
job exit occurs significantly more frequently during the first two years of a ‘treated’ 
spell; the increase is in the range of 54 to 77 per cent. Most FTCs are either terminated 
or have been converted into permanent contracts after this time. The baseline hazard for 
the following two or three years shows that the job exit probability is actually lower for 
treated than for untreated spells. This holds in tendency both for men and women, but 
the effect is less pronounced for men, where only one of the coefficients is significant at 
the ten per cent level.  
Since we do not control for unobserved person-specific effects in the estimation, the 
estimated baseline reflects true duration dependence (for instance, due to accumulation 
of human capital) as well as changes in the pool of matches and individuals. Since the 
only possible explanation for greater job stability in treated spells is that the 
composition of workers and matches changes with duration, we interpret this finding as 
evidence in favour of a sorting process. In jobs with an initial FTC contract, mobility 
that would occur even under permanent contracts is accelerated in the first two years of 
an employment spell. After two years, the sorting process slows down in treated spells 
but continues in untreated spells, so that the survivor functions converge.  
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7 Conclusions 
According to our results, FTCs accelerate exit within the first two years of an 
employment spell by 55 to 80 per cent. However, employment spells started on the basis 
of FTCs are more stable than jobs started on permanent contracts in the following years. 
These results are consistent with a role of FTCs as probationary periods. If firing costs 
are low initially, bad matches are dissolved earlier than under high firing costs. 
Ultimately, however, a firm will dismiss all the bad matches. Concerning other theories 
of temporary work, the result of the reversion of the relative exit rates for the two types 
of contracts after two years is inconsistent with any of them. 
Another result is that the chances that an employment spell will last longer than five 
years are not influenced negatively if the worker is initially employed on a fixed-term 
contract (FTC). While this result, unlike the acceleration of the sorting process, is not an 
implication of the theoretical model presented in section 2, it is consistent with it under 
certain parameter constellations. The result must, however, be interpreted with care, 
since FTCs with very short durations are under-represented in our data. 
A normative conclusion from the results is that FTCs are likely to improve the average 
quality of job-employee matches because matches that are likely to be bad are 
terminated earlier. A potential drawback could be that many good matches on FTCs are 
terminated accidentally. Our results do not corroborate this view, since both types of 
contracts lead to the same proportion of long-term employment. This also contradicts 
the prediction of Blanchard and Landier (2002) that FTC contracts are terminated at an 
inefficiently high rate.  
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 Table A1: Defintion of the variables, sample means and standard deviations 
Variable Definition Mean Std.Dev. 
No education Without completed vocational 
education or A-levels (dummy) 
0.284 0.451 
Master Allowed to teach apprentices 0.054 0.226 
University Completed university or polytechnic 
education (dummy) 
0.089 0.284 
Age  38.072 10.382 
Foreigner Any nationality other than German 
(dummy) 
0.260 0.4389 
Disabled Legally recognised as handicapped or 
partially incapable of work 
0.042 0.200 
Children At least one child below age 18 
(dummy) 
0.487 0.500 
Married  0.697 0.459 
Divorced/widowed  0.067 0.250 
Dismissed Dismissed from previous job (dummy) 0.033 0.180 
Expiry of previous FTC Previous job ended with expiration of 
FTC employment (dummy) 
0.006 0.076 
Tenure last job Months spent in previous job 0.573 2.572 
Never on FTC Work history does not include FTC 
spell (dummy) 
0.869 0.337 
Number of UE spells Number of years in unemployment 
recorded in data 
0.327 0.968 
Duration of UE spell Length of previous unemployment 
spell 
0.562 4.896 
Duration of OLF spell Length of previous spell out of labour 
force 
3.020 16.006 
UR Official unemployment rate of federal 
state 
8.802 2.558 
FTC Fixed-term contract employment 0.024 0.153 
Permanent Permanent contract employment 0.587 0.492 
Vocational training  0.015 0.122 
Self-employed  0.077 0.266 
Unemployed  0.061 0.239 
OLF Out of labour force 0.225 0.417 
Match position/qualification Position is the same as the profession 
for which worker was educated 
0.329 0.470 
Wage  Monthly wage divided by 4.35 time 
actual hours worked per week 
11.304 5.819 
Firm size < 20  0.336 0.473 
Firm size 20-199  0.256 0.436 
Firm size 200-1999  0.209 0.407 
Firm size > 2000  0.198 0.399 
 Table A2: Probit estimates of the propensity score 
 Men Women 
 Coeff Std.Err. Coeff Std.Err. 
No education  0.056 0.074 0.053 0.072 
Master ** -0.270 0.136 -0.096 0.179 
University -0.032 0.101 *** 0.439 0.113 
Age * -0.282 0.149 -0.160 0.161 
Age squared ** 0.852 0.418 0.445 0.442 
Age cubic ** -0.809 0.376 -0.395 0.393 
Foreigner *** 0.193 0.070 0.061 0.077 
Disabled 0.254 0.168 0.213 0.179 
Children -0.019 0.069 0.071 0.074 
Married 0.043 0.082 -0.091 0.093 
Divorced/widowed 0.141 0.143 0.185 0.128 
Dismissed * 0.155 0.094 -0.001 0.123 
Expiry of previous FTC 0.130 0.132 *** 0.540 0.154 
Tenure last job -0.016 0.011 -0.012 0.013 
Never on FTC * -0.142 0.075 0.049 0.086 
Number of UE spells 0.004 0.030 -0.041 0.038 
Duration of UE spell -0.003 0.005 0.001 0.007 
Duration of OLF spell *** -0.042 0.015 -0.001 0.001 
FTC*UR -0.057 0.047 -0.009 0.051 
Permanent*UR -0.032 0.028 0.016 0.033 
UE*UR 0.022 0.032 0.021 0.037 
OLF*UR * 0.066 0.040 0.012 0.035 
Permanent -0.520 0.407 -0.603 0.445 
Vocational training * -0.814 0.482 -0.169 0.515 
Self-employed -0.736 0.469 -0.602 0.514 
Unemployed -0.681 0.445 -0.340 0.485 
OLF * -0.851 0.498 -0.511 0.457 
Permanent-1 *** -0.440 0.126 -0.191 0.161 
Vocational training-1 -0.334 0.220 -0.307 0.259 
Self-employed-1 -0.146 0.165 -0.158 0.200 
Unemployed-1 -0.093 0.148 0.144 0.181 
OLF-1 -0.101 0.157 -0.043 0.171 
Number of observations 2957 2582 
Log-likelihood initial  -1390.48 -1267.55 
Log-likelihood final -1266.64 -1198.88 
Notes: Time dummies and regional dummies included. Standard errors allow for clustering at the person 
level.  ***, ** and * denote significance at the one, five and ten per cent level. 
 Table A3: Balancing test 
Variable  Men Women 
  %bias t-Stat. %bias t-Stat. 
No education Unmatched 17.00 3.57 2.30 0.45 
 Matched -1.40 0.08 -1.40 -0.31 
Master Unmatched -16.30 -3.02 -3.00 -0.57 
 Matched -0.90 -0.17 5.10 0.81 
University Unmatched -7.50 -1.47 19.00 4.08 
 Matched 1.40 0.09 -6.40 -0.23 
Age Unmatched -2.00 -0.40 -0.70 -0.14 
 Matched -2.70 -0.68 -7.10 -1.20 
Foreigner Unmatched 18.90 3.94 5.60 1.11 
 Matched -4.60 -0.29 -2.10 -0.20 
Disabled Unmatched 12.50 2.88 5.20 1.06 
 Matched 4.70 1.01 4.00 0.52 
Children Unmatched 1.60 0.33 2.50 0.48 
 Matched -0.40 0.06 8.80 1.39 
Married Unmatched -2.90 -0.59 -11.80 -2.31 
 Matched -3.40 -0.56 7.70 0.84 
Divorced/widowed Unmatched 4.00 0.83 12.70 2.62 
 Matched 2.90 0.52 -8.90 -0.93 
Dismissed Unmatched 16.90 3.65 1.30 0.26 
 Matched -4.30 -0.47 -7.40 -1.04 
Expiry of previous FTC Unmatched 12.70 2.84 22.90 5.38 
 Matched -5.80 -0.73 1.00 1.14 
Tenure last job Unmatched -2.50 -0.49 -4.20 -0.77 
 Matched -3.10 -0.71 5.70 1.16 
Never on FTC Unmatched -26.00 -5.46 -3.30 -0.64 
 Matched -9.00 -2.04 -4.60 -0.70 
Number of UE spells Unmatched 25.90 5.79 15.50 3.11 
 Matched 0.00 0.17 1.60 0.59 
Duration of UE spell Unmatched 19.40 4.15 11.90 2.54 
 Matched -5.40 -0.48 1.80 0.15 
Duration of OLF spell Unmatched -3.60 -0.62 -2.50 -0.48 
 Matched 3.70 1.54 -1.60 -0.31 
Propensity score Unmatched 32.8 6.99 -11.9 1.62 
 Matched 0.00 0.64 0.00 0.85 
 
 
